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2008, with the bailout of Bear Stearns’ creditors. The NewYork Fed
assumed the risk of loss for $30 billion (later reduced to $29 billion) of assets
held in the portfolio of the investment bank Bear Stearns as inducement for
its acquisition by J.P. Morgan Chase. In addition, it opened the discount
window to primary dealers in government securities, some of which were part
of investment banks rather than commercial banks. The rationale for this and
subsequent extensions of the safety net was prevention of the systemic risk
of a cascading series of defaults brought about by wholesale withdrawal of
investors from money markets and depositors from banks. At the same time,
thereisalsorecognitionofhowaﬁnancialsafetynetcreatesmoralhazard,that
is, an increased incentive to risk-taking (Lacker 2008). Given the twin goals
of ﬁnancial stability and mitigation of moral hazard, what ﬁnancial (monetary
and regulatory) regime should emerge as a successor to the current one?
Such a regime must address the consensus that ﬁnancial institutions took
on excessive risk in the period from 2003 to the summer of 2007. They did
so through the use of leverage that involved borrowing short-term, low-cost
funds to fund long-term, illiquid, risky assets. The conclusion follows that a
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new ﬁnancial regime must limit risk-taking. However, should that limitation
come from increased oversight by government regulators or should it come
fromtheenhancedmarketdisciplinethatwouldfollowfromsharplycurtailing
the ﬁnancial safety net? Each alternative raises the issue of tradeoffs. Does
the optimal mix of ﬁnancial stability and minimal moral hazard lie with an
extensive ﬁnancial safety net and heavy government regulation of the risk-
taking encouraged by moral hazard? Alternatively, does the optimal mix lie
with a limited ﬁnancial safety net and the market monitoring of risk-taking
that comes with the possibility of bank runs combined with procedures for
placing large ﬁnancial institutions into conservatorship?
This article argues for the latter alternative. Its feasibility requires the
premisethattheﬁnancialsystemwouldnotbeinherentlyfragileintheabsence
of an extensive ﬁnancial safety net. Such a premise involves contentious
counterfactuals. There is no shortcut to the use of historical experience to
decidebetweentwocontrastingviewsofwhatcausesﬁnancialmarketfragility.






will run? Alternatively, in the absence of the risk-taking induced by the moral
hazardofthesafetynet,wouldmarketdisciplineproducecontractsandcapital
levelssufﬁcienttoprotectallbutinsolventbanksfromruns? Wouldregulators
then be able to place insolvent banks into conservatorship (with mandatory
haircuts to debtors and large depositors) without destabilizing the remainder
of the ﬁnancial system?
Section1criticizestheperenniallypopularassumptionthatﬁnancialmar-
kets are inherently prone to speculative excess followed by subsequent
collapse. If monetary arrangements prevent the occurrence of monetary dis-
turbances that interfere with the market determination of the real interest rate,
the price system works well to prevent extended ﬂuctuations in economic ac-
tivity around trend growth. Creditors and debtors will restrain risk-taking by
the ﬁnancial system if they can lose money in the event of the failure of ﬁnan-
cialinstitutions. Section2illustratesthetradeoffscreatedbyaﬁnancialsafety
netthroughtheexampleoftherunonprimemoneymarketfundsthatoccurred
after the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Section 3 sum-
marizes the rise of too big to fail (TBTF). The safety net considered in this
article includes not only deposit insurance and TBTF but also the ways that
government subsidizes private risk-taking through the off-budget allocation
of credit to housing. Section 4 then examines the role of off-budget housing
subsidies in the housing boom-bust experience, especially as provided by theR. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 163
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs).1 Government use of off-budget
subsidies to allocate capital toward housing and away from other productive
uses has been a major source of ﬁnancial instability both recently and in the
1980s.
Section 6 discusses the interaction between TBTF policies and the risk-
takingofbanksreﬂectedintheconcentrationofmortgagelendingintheirasset
portfoliosandthecreationofoff-balance-sheetvehiclesforholdingsecuritized
mortgage debt. Based on the conclusion that the current system of a steadily
expanding ﬁnancial safety net combined with heavy regulation has increased
ﬁnancial instability, Section 7 advances a proposal for limiting the ﬁnancial
safety net. An appendix reviews the literature on banking panics. This review
does not support the inherent-fragility belief underlying the current extensive
ﬁnancial safety net. That is, it does not support the belief that regulators must
preventﬁnancialinstitutionsfromfailinginawaythatimposeslossesonbank
creditors (debtors and large depositors) in order to head off a general panic
that closes solvent and insolvent banks alike.
1. CAN MARKET DISCIPLINEAND THE PRICE SYSTEM
WORK?
As shown in Figure 1, living standards as measured by output per capita have
risen over time. At the same time, there are signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations around
trend. IntheobjectivelanguageoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch,
economists refer to the upturns as economic expansions and the downturns
as economic declines. In popular discourse, there is a counterpart language
of booms and busts driven by bright exuberance and dark pessimism. The
most pronounced ﬂuctuations in the graph mark the downturn of the Great
Depression and the upturn of World War II. The combination of prolonged
high unemployment during the Depression followed by low unemployment
during World War II gave rise to Keynesian models based on the assumption
thatthepricesystemhadfailedtocoordinateeconomicactivityincompetitive
markets. Keynesian models ceded to dynamic, optimizing models within
which the price system coordinates economic activity. In these latter models,
givenfrictions(forexample,pricestickiness),shocksdriveoutputﬂuctuations.
Despite this progress in macroeconomic modeling, the current recession
has recreated much of the intellectual and policymaking environment of the
Depression. In the Depression, popular opinion held speculation on Wall
Street responsible for the economic collapse. In the current recession, popu-
lar opinion again holds Wall Street responsible. The greed of bankers created
1 The GSEs are the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), and the Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA).164 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly

























Notes: Annual observations of 100 times the logarithm of per capita real output. Real
output is real gross national product (GNP) from Balke and Gordon (1986) until 1929.
Thereafter, real output is real GNP from the Commerce Department.
speculative excess. The inevitable collapse created an overhang of bad debt
and a dysfunctional ﬁnancial system that has prevented consumers and busi-
nesses from spending.
IntheDepression, toreviveﬁnancialintermediation, theHooveradminis-
tration created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to recapitalize banks
and thus to stimulate commercial lending. The Roosevelt administration cre-
atedavarietyofGSEstoencouragelending;forexample,itcreatedtheFederal
NationalMortgageAssociationtostimulatelendinginthehousingmarket. To
limit the risk-taking presumed to be driven by speculative excess, Congress
passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, which separated commercial and in-
vestment banking. Corresponding to the concentration on credit policies,
policymakers paid no attention to the money creation of the Federal Reserve.
In the current recession, just as in the Depression, the short-term empha-
sis has been on reviving ﬁnancial intermediation. Public debate focused on
the long-term has emphasized government regulation of risk-taking by ﬁnan-
cial institutions. Beyond measures to revive markets for the securitization ofR. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 165
mortgage and consumer debt and to stimulate lending by commercial banks
through the removal of “toxic” assets and through recapitalization, policy-
makers have emphasized ﬁscal stimulus through a combination of tax cuts
and expenditure. The rationale for these programs seems little more than
what economists offered in the Depression. In economic downturns, because
banks do not lend enough, either the central bank or government GSEs should
make up the deﬁcit in lending. Similarly, because the public does not spend
enough, the government should make up the deﬁciency with deﬁcit spending.
One strand of the current debate reﬂects a centuries-old psychological ex-
planation of economic ﬂuctuations based on the observed correlation between
the optimism and distress in ﬁnancial markets with the respective cyclical up-
swings and downturns in the economy. Indeed, the founders of the Fed wrote
the real bills doctrine into The Federal Reserve Act based on the belief that
cycles of speculative mania followed by busts accounted for economic ﬂuctu-
ations (Hetzel 2008, Ch. 3). The absence of discussion regarding the modern
models of economics reﬂects the implicit assumption that the price system
has failed and that government action must supersede its working. But is this
popular diagnosis correct and should policy again follow the intellectual out-
lines advanced in the Depression? Are current policies based on correlations
between ﬁnancial and economic distress that do not reﬂect causation running
from the former to the latter. In brief, are current policies treating symptoms
rather than causes?
This article and its counterpart (Hetzel 2009) offer a critique of current
policy. The current recession does not constitute a failure of the price system
to regulate economic ﬂuctuations and a failure of markets to regulate risk ad-
equately. Rather, the recession reﬂects the way in which monetary policy and
the ﬁnancial safety net have undercut market mechanisms. The real interest
rate plays the role of ﬂy wheel in the stabilization of economic ﬂuctuations
around trend. When the public is optimistic about the future, the real interest
rate needs to be relatively high. Conversely, pessimism about the future re-
quiresarelativelylowrealrate. Therealinterestrateplaysthisroleadequately
in the absence of inertia introduced by central bank interest rate smoothing
relativetocyclicalmovementsinoutput. Suchsmoothinglimitsthedeclinein
interest rates in response to declines in economic activity through restraint in
money creation and similarly limits the increase in interest rates in response
to increases in economic activity through increases in money creation (Hetzel
2009).
The focus in this article is on how the ﬁnancial safety net encouraged ex-
cessiverisk-takingbyeliminatingthemonitoringthatwouldoccurifthecred-
itorsofbanks(largedepositorsanddebtholders)sufferedlossesintheeventof
bank insolvency. Furthermore, the article makes the argument that the unsus-
tainable rise in house prices and their subsequent sharp decline derived from
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levels and from a ﬁnancial safety net that encouraged excessive risk-taking by
banks through asset portfolios concentrated in mortgages. There is a need for
more regulation of the risk-taking of banks but that regulation should come
from the market discipline imposed through severe limitation of the ﬁnancial
safety net, especially elimination of TBTF. Also, the political system should
allow the marketplace to determine the allocation of the capital stock between
housing and other productive uses.
2. TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL? THE CASE OF THE MONEY
MARKET FUNDS
What are the tradeoffs that society faces in creating a ﬁnancial safety net to
preventbankruns? Or, asSenatorCarterGlassputtheissueduringtheSenate
debate on the BankingAct of 1933 (the Glass-SteagallAct), “Is there any rea-
son why theAmerican people should be taxed to guarantee the debts of banks,
anymorethantheyshouldbetaxedtoguaranteethedebtsofotherinstitutions,
including the merchants, the industries, and the mills of the country?”2
Thereisamarketdemandforﬁnancialinstrumentsredeemableatparor,in
more current terminology, with stable NAV (net-asset value). Many investors
(depositors) want to be able to withdraw on demand a dollar for every dollar
invested (deposited) in a ﬁnancial institution. At the same time, investors also
like to receive interest. Traditionally, banks have supplied such instruments.
Theyhaveinvestedininterest-bearingassetswhileholdingsufﬁcientcapitalto
guarantee against credit risk so that they can guarantee withdrawal of deposits
at par. At the same time, the ability to withdraw bank deposits at par and on
demand creates the possibility of bank runs, which can destabilize economic
activity.
A ﬁnancial safety net constituted by deposit insurance and TBTF can
precludebankrunsbutatthecostofcreatingperversemoralhazardincentives.
The safety net provides an incentive to banks to acquire risky assets offering
a high rate of return without increasing capital commensurately. In good
times, bank shareholders do well, while in extremely bad times the insurance
fund bails out the bank’s depositors and debtholders. In principle, regulators
could draw a clear line demarcating the ﬁnancial safety net. On the insured
side, regulators would limit risk-taking and require high capital ratios. On the
uninsured side, creditors with their own money at risk would do this work by
requiring limitations on risk-taking and high capital ratios. The tension arises
when regulators cannot draw a credible line separating the insured from the
uninsured. Institutions on the uninsured side have an incentive to ﬁnd ways
to retain the cheap funds guaranteed by the perception that they are on the
2 Cited by Walker Todd (2008) from Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley’s, Carter Glass: A
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insured side while acquiring the risky asset portfolios with high returns of
institutions on the uninsured side.
For example, some economists in the 1930s proposed a line with “narrow
banks” on the safe side. These banks, which would hold 100 percent reserves
against deposits and thus be run-proof, would provide payment services. All
other banks would be investment banks (Hart 1935). Friedman (1960, 73)
pointed out “the existence of a strong incentive to evade the requirement of
100% reserve. Much ingenuity might thus be devoted to giving medium-of-
exchange qualities to near-monies that did not qualify under the letter of the
law as deposits requiring 100% reserves.” The run on money market funds
following the Lehman bankruptcy illustrates these forces.
MarketcommentaryprovidesevidencethatbeforetheLehmanbankruptcy
investors assumed that regulators would never let a large ﬁnancial institution
default on its debt. That is, the ofﬁcial line between the insured and uninsured
institutions was not credibly drawn. The bailout of Bear Stearns debthold-
ers in March 2008 and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debtholders in early
September 2008 reinforced this belief. Moreover, the Primary Dealer Credit
FacilityannouncedMarch16,2008,plausiblybroughtintotheﬁnancialsafety
net investment banks like Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman
Sachs because of their status as primary dealers in government securities.3
As a result, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September and later
the losses imposed on debtholders with the closure of the thrift, Washington
Mutual, produced a discrete increase in the market’s perception of default
risk among ﬁnancial institutions. At the same time, a money fund, Reserve
Primary Fund, “broke the buck.” That is, as a result of holding Lehman debt
rendered worthless by the Lehman bankruptcy, the value of the assets of this
3 For example, The Washington Post (Irwin 2008) wrote shortly after the collapse of Bear
Stearns: “With its March 14 decision to make a special loan to Bear Stearns and a decision two
days later to become an emergency lender to all of the major investment ﬁrms, the central bank
abandoned 75 years of precedent under which it offered direct backing only to traditional banks.
Inside the Fed and out, there is a realization that those moves amounted to crossing the Rubicon,
setting the stage for a deeper involvement in the little-regulated markets for capital that have come
to dominate the ﬁnancial world. Leaders of the central bank had no master plan when they took
those actions, no long-term strategy for taking a more assertive role regulating Wall Street. They
were focused on the immediate crisis....Fed leaders knew that they were setting a precedent that
would indelibly affect perceptions of how the central bank would act in a crisis. Now that the
central bank has intervened in the workings of Wall Street, all sorts of players in the ﬁnancial
markets will assume that it could happen again. Major investment banks might be willing to take
on more risk, assuming that the Fed will be there to bail them out if the bets go wrong....The
parties that do business with investment banks might be less careful about monitoring whether
the bank will be able to honor obscure ﬁnancial contracts. That would eliminate a key form of
self-regulation for investment banks.”
The Wall Street Journal (2008f) reported: “After Bear Stearns’s brush with death, the Federal
Reserve for the ﬁrst time allowed investment houses to borrow from the government on much
the same terms as commercial banks. Many on Wall Street saw investment banks’ access to an
equivalent of the so-called Fed discount window as a blank check should hard times return.”168 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
fund declined below the value of its liabilities.4 Many large institutional in-
vestors immediately withdrew their funds from other prime money market
funds out of fear that these funds could also be holding paper from investment
banks faced with the possibility of default. Because the prime brokerage op-
erations of commercial banks were effectively included in the ﬁnancial safety
net while those of the investment banks were not, customers of the remaining
investment banks shifted their accounts to commercial banks; the remaining
investment banks then appeared uncompetitive.
The Fed and the Treasury intervened to limit the run on prime money
funds in two ways. First, with the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) announced September
19, 2008, money funds became eligible to borrow from the discount window
at the Boston Fed using asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) as collateral.
Second,onSeptember29,2008,theTreasuryannouncedaprogramtoguaran-
tee the shares of money market fund investors held as of September 19, 2008,
in participating funds.5 Prime money market funds held signiﬁcant amounts
of short-term debt issued by banks. Especially, given the uncertain ﬁnancial
situationofsomelargebanksatthetime,therewasnoreadyalternativemarket
for this debt.6 By extending the ﬁnancial safety net to prime money market
mutual funds, regulators avoided market disruption.
At the same time, regulators created moral hazard problems. Money
market mutual funds have competed with banks by offering redemption of
theirdepositsatpar(NAVstability). Moreprecisely,theyhaveusedamortized
cost accounting rather than mark-to-market accounting. As a result, when the
value of their assets falls, they do not mark down the value of their shares.
Shareholders then have an incentive to run in case the fund breaks the buck.
With mark-to-market accounting, in contrast, there is no incentive to run.
4As of March 2006, the Reserve Primary Fund invested only in government securities. It
then began to invest in riskier commercial paper, which by 2008 comprised almost 60 percent
of its portfolio. In that way, it could raise the yield it offered and attract more customers while
exploiting the image of money market mutual funds as risk-free. The Wall Street Journal (2008e)
wrote: “[B]y this September [2008], the Primary Fund’s 12-month yield was the highest among
more than 2,100 money funds tracked, according to Morningstar—4.04%, versus an average of
2.75%. With this stellar yield, the fund’s assets tripled in two years to $62.6 billion.”
5 More generally, all governments expanded insurance of the liabilities of their ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in part to prevent them from being placed at a competitive disadvantage with banks of other
nations whose governments extended blanket insurance to their banks. Such actions represented
an increase in protectionism through subsidization of the ability of national banks to compete for
funds.
6 Preventing a run on money market funds worked as part of TBTF in that the prime funds
held signiﬁcant amounts of bank debt. “A large share of outstanding commercial paper is issued
or sponsored by ﬁnancial intermediaries” (Board of Governors 2008). This arrangement whereby
banks raise funds indirectly rather than by issuing their own deposits arises in part as a way of
circumventing the legal prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits. Elimination of this
prohibition would make the ﬁnancial system less fragile.R. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 169
Primemoneymarketfundshadbeencompetingforfundsasbankswithout
the signiﬁcant regulatory costs that come with being a bank. If, in September,
regulators had drawn the ﬁnancial-safety-net line to exclude money market
mutual funds, these funds would have been subject to the market discipline of
possiblefailure. Theywouldthenhavehadtomakeoneoftwohardchoicesto
become run-proof. Prime money funds could have chosen some combination
of high capital and extremely safe, but low-yielding, commercial paper and
government debt. Alternatively, they could have accepted variable NAV as
the price of holding risky assets. Either way, the money market mutual fund
industry would have had to shrink. At present, the incentive exists for money
fundstotakeadvantageofthegovernmentsafetynetbyincreasingtheriskiness
of their asset portfolios.
3. THE RISE OF TBTF
In his 1986 book Bailout, Irvine Sprague, who was chairman of the Federal
DepositInsuranceCorporation(FDIC)from1979through1981andcontinued
as a board member through 1985, detailed the origin of TBTF. This section
summarizes his discussion of the issues raised by TBTF. Would there be a
“domino” effect of closing a large bank with losses to its large creditors?
What are the moral hazard consequences of TBTF?
Congress had intended that deposit insurance be used only to compensate
holders of insured deposits at failed banks. There was no intention for the
FDIC to bail out uninsured depositors and debtholders. In the 1950 Federal
Deposit InsuranceAct, Congress added an “essentiality” condition to restrict
FDIC bailouts. This act gave the FDIC authority to make an insolvent bank
solvent by transferring funds to the bank only if it “is essential to provide
adequate banking services in its community.” Ironically, the FDIC used that
language to justify expanding its mandate to one of bailing out all creditors of
insolvent banks (Sprague 1986, 27ff).
According to Sprague (1986, 48 and 38), the FDIC set the precedent for
bailouts and the move “away from our historic narrow role of acting only after
the bank had failed” in 1971 with the African American-owned bank, Unity
Bank, in inner-city Boston out of fear that its failure would “touch off a new
round of 1960s-style rioting.” The systemic-failure rationale for bailouts ﬁrst
arose in 1972 in connection with the failure of the Detroit Commonwealth
Bank, which had a billion-dollar asset portfolio. According to Sprague’s
account, the Fed always vociferously supported bailouts. Sprague (1986,
53, 70) cited Fed Board chairman Arthur Burns’fear that “the domino effect
could be started by failure of this large bank with its extensive commercial
loan business and its relationships with scores of banks....Nobody wanted to
face up to the biggest bank failure in history, particularly the Fed.”170 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The systemic argument appeared again with the 1980 bailout of First
Pennsylvania Bank with $9 billion in assets and whose “[l]oan quality was
poor” and whose “[l]everage was excessive” (Sprague 1986, 85 and 89):
The domino theory dominated the discussion—if First Pennsylvania
went down, its business connections with other banks would entangle
them also and touch off a crisis in conﬁdence that would snowball into
other bank failures here and abroad. It would culminate in an international
ﬁnancial crisis....Fed Chairman Paul Volcker said he planned to continue
funding indeﬁnitely until we could work out a merger or a bailout to
save the bank.
The policy of TBTF took off in the early 1980s during the less-developed
country (LDC) debt crisis. When Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico effectively
defaultedontheirdebt,almostalllargeU.S.moneycenterbanksbecameinsol-
vent (Hetzel 2008, Ch. 14). Regulator unwillingness to close large, insolvent
banks became publicly apparent in 1984 with the bailout of the debtholders
and uninsured depositors of Continental Illinois and of its bank holding com-
pany. At the time, regulators claimed that they had no choice but to bail out
Continental because of the large number of banks holding correspondent bal-
anceswithit.7 Subsequentresearchshowedthatevenwithlossessigniﬁcantly
greater than estimated at the time only two banks would have incurred losses
greater than 50 percent of their capital (Kaufman 1990, 8).8 After the Con-
tinental bailout, the Comptroller of the Currency told Congress that 11 bank
holding companies were too big to fail (Boyd and Gertler 1994, 7). However,
regulators also extended TBTF to small banks. For example, in 1990, regula-
tors bailed out the National Bank of Washington, which ranked 250th by size
in the United States (Hetzel 1991).
“AlthoughContinentalIllinoishadover$30billionindeposits,90percent
were uninsured foreign deposits or large certiﬁcates substantially exceeding
the $100,000 insurance limit....First Pennsylvania had a cancerous interest-
rate mismatch; Continental was drowning in bad loans” (Sprague 1986, 184
and 199). Continental, with its risky loan portfolio due to lack of diversiﬁ-
cation and wholesale funding, became the prototype for future failures and
bailouts. Continental held a “shocking” $1 billion in loan participations from
the Oklahoma bank Penn Square, which had “grown pathologically” and had
made “chancy loans to drillers” (Sprague 1986, 111–3). Penn Square had in
turngrownrapidlywithwholesalemoney. “ThePennSquareexperiencegave
7 William Isaac, chairman of the FDIC during the Continental bailout, later expressed regret,
noting that most of the large banks about which the FDIC was concerned failed subsequently with
greater losses to the FDIC than if they had been closed earlier (Kaufman 1990, 12).
8 With TBTF, banks and other ﬁnancial market participants possess no incentive to diversify
their exposure to other ﬁnancial institutions thereby making TBTF a self-fulﬁlling need.R. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 171
us a rough alert to the damage that can be done by brokered deposits funneled
in the troubled institutions” (Sprague 1986, 133).
Regulators were unwilling to let Continental fail with losses to creditors
because of the fear of systemic risk: “...Volcker raised the familiar concern
about a national banking collapse, that is, a chain reaction if Continental
should fail” (Sprague 1986, 183).9 However, Continental highlighted all the
moral hazard issues associated with TBTF and excessive risk-taking. Later,
the Wall Street Journal (1994) wrote: “Continental’s place in history may be
as a warning against too-rapid growth and against placing too much emphasis
on one sector of the banking business—in this case energy lending.”
Sprague (1986, 249 and preface, xi) foretold the problems of 2007–2008:
The banking giants are getting a free ride on their insurance premi-
ums and ﬂaunting capital standards by moving liabilities off their balance
sheets....[T]he regulators...should address the question of off-book lia-
bilities....Continental...had 30 billion of off-book liabilities.
I hope this book will help raise public awareness of the pitfalls...of
the exotic new ﬁnancial world of the 1980s.
Sprague (1986, preface, x) also observed:
Continental was...alink in a [bailout] chain that we had been forging
since the 1971 rescue of Unity Bank....Other bailouts [beyond Unity],
of successively larger institutions, followed in ensuing years; there is no
reason to think that the chain has been completed yet.
This“chain”nowseemslikelytostretchoutforever—acreationofregula-
tors’fearofsystemicriskandtheincreasingincentivetorisk-takingpromoted
by an ever-expanding ﬁnancial safety net. Walter and Weinberg (2002) esti-
mated that, in 1999, 61 percent of the liabilities of ﬁnancial institutions were
either explicitly guaranteed by the government or could plausibly be regarded
as implicitly guaranteed. Under the rubric of TBTF, these insured liabilities
included the liabilities of the 21 largest bank holding companies and the two
largest thrift holding companies. This estimate seems overly conservative,
however. As Walter and Weinberg (2002, 380) pointed out,
When troubles in large banks have surfaced in the past, uninsured
holders of short-term liabilities frequently have been able to withdraw
their funds from the troubled bank before regulators have taken it over.
Bank access to loans from the Federal Reserve has allowed short-term
liability holders to escape losses.
9 Sprague (1986, 165) reported the concern that if Continental failed, deposit withdrawals
would spread to Manufacturers Hanover, a bank under duress because of its exposure to LDC
debt.172 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Goodfriend and Lacker (1999) addressed the contradiction of assuring
stability through bailouts while increasing it through the moral hazard arising
from bailouts. The ﬁnancial panic of 2008 ﬁts the Goodfriend-Lacker hy-
pothesis that the dialectic of excessive risk-taking, ﬁnancial losses triggered
by a macroeconomic shock, and runs on insolvent institutions, followed by
further extension of the safety net, will lead to ever-larger crises. As a way out
of this spiral, they point to the Volcker disinﬂation in which the Fed incurred
the short-run cost of disinﬂation through following a consistent strategy to
maintain low inﬂation and, as a result, to reap the long-run beneﬁts of price
stability. Just as the Fed conditioned the public’s expectations to conform to
an environment of near price stability, regulators could condition investor ex-
pectationstoconformtoanenvironmentinwhichbankcreditorsbearlossesin
the event of a bank failure. Creditors would then monitor and limit bank risk-
taking. The Appendix examines critically the counter argument that bailouts
are inevitable because of an inherent systemic risk endemic to banking.
4. OFF-BUDGET HOUSING SUBSIDIES
Understanding the role of the subprime crisis in the current ﬁnancial crisis re-
quiresunderstandingtheroleplayedbytheGSEs. Theyincreasedthedemand
forthehousingstock,helpedraisethehomeownershipratetoanunsustainable
level, and, as a consequence of a relatively inelastic supply of housing due to
land constraints, contributed to a sharp rise in housing prices.10 That rapid
rise in housing prices made the issuance of subprime and Alt-A loans appear
relatively risk-free.
In 1990, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae owned 4.7 percent of U.S. resi-
dential mortgage debt and by 1997 they owned 11.4 percent. In 1998, that
ﬁgure began to rise sharply and in 2002 it reached 20.4 percent (the ﬁgure is
46 percent including mortgage debt guaranteed for payment of principal and
interest).11 After 2003, as a result of portfolio caps placed on these companies
by the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) because of
accounting irregularities, their market share declined. However, they con-
tinued to purchase subprime and Alt-A loans.12 The Congressional Budget
10 Duca (2005, 5) provides citations showing that the rise in house prices was most pro-
nounced in areas in which land supply was inelastic. Also, the swings in house prices were
dominated by changes in land prices, not structure costs.
11 Total residential mortgage debt outstanding is from the Board of Governors’ Flow of Funds
Accounts, Table L. 218. Data on the holding of mortgages by Fannie and Freddie and on the
total mortgage-backed securities they guaranteed are from OFHEO (2008, 116).
12 The Washington Post (Goldfarb 2008) reported, “In a memo to former Freddie chief ex-
ecutive ofﬁcer Richard Syron and other top executives, former Freddie chief enterprise risk ofﬁcer
David Andrukonis wrote that the company was buying mortgages that appear ‘to target borrow-
ers who would have trouble qualifying for a mortgage if their ﬁnancial position were adequately
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Ofﬁce (U.S. Congress 2008) reported that as of 2008:Q2 Freddie and Fannie
held $780 billion, or 15 percent, of their portfolios in these assets.13 The
Federal Housing Administration also encouraged borrowers to take out high
loan-to-value mortgages.14
Early in the 2000s, the GSEs channeled increased foreign demand for
riskless dollar-denominated debt into the housing market. When the interest
rate on U.S. government securities fell to low levels, they encouraged foreign
investors to shift fromTreasury securities to agency debt (Timmons 2008). In
doing so, investors could take advantage of somewhat higher yields on debt
with an implicit government guarantee. In March 2000, foreigners owned 7.3
percent of the total outstanding GSE debt ($261 billion) and, in June 2007,
they owned 21.4 percent of the total ($1.3 trillion).15 Foreign central banks
and other ofﬁcial institutions owned almost $1 trillion of GSE debt in 2008.16
Othergovernmentpoliciesthatincreasedthedemandforthehousingstock
included Community Reinvestment Act lending by banks. In 1996, lending
under this program began to increase substantially because of a change in reg-
ulationsthatprovidedquantitativeguidelinesforbanklendingtocommunities
judged underserved by regulators (Johnsen and Myers 1996). Furthermore,
in 1997, Congress increased the value of a house as an investment by elim-
inating capital gains taxes on proﬁts of $500,000 or less on sales of homes.
“VernonL.Smith,aNobellaureateandeconomicsprofessoratGeorgeMason
borrowers, and they could lead to loans being made to people who would be unlikely to pay
them off.”
“Mudd [former Fannie Mae CEO] later reported that Fannie moved into this market ‘to main-
tain relevance’ with big customers who wanted to do more business with Fannie, including Coun-
trywide, Lehman Brothers, IndyMac and Washington Mutual. The documents suggest that Fannie
and Freddie knew they were playing a role in shaping the market for some types of risky mort-
gages. An email to Mudd in September 2007 from a top deputy reported that banks were modeling
their subprime mortgages to what Fannie was buying....‘I’m not convinced we aren’t leading the
market into this product,’ Andrukonis wrote.”
13 The numbers could be larger. As reported in the New York Times (Browning 2008), “The
former executive, Edward J. Pinto, who was chief credit ofﬁcer at Fannie Mae, told the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee that the mortgage giants now guarantee or hold 10.5
million nonprime loans worth $1.6 trillion—one in three of all subprime loans, and nearly two in
three of all so-called Alt-A loans, often called ‘liar loans.’ Such loans now make up 34 percent
of the total single-family mortgage portfolios at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”
“Arnold Kling, an economist who once worked at Freddie Mac, testiﬁed that a high-risk loan
could be ‘laundered,’ as he put it, by Wall Street and returned to the banking system as a triple-
A-rated security....Housing analysts say that the former heads of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
increased their non-prime business because they felt pressure from the government and advocacy
groups to meet goals for affordable housing.”
14 The FHA insured no-down-payment loans through down payment assistance programs. A
homebuilder made a contribution to a “nonproﬁt” organization, which cycled the money to the
homebuyer. The homebuilder received his money back through an above-market price for the
house. The buyer paid a fee to the “nonproﬁt.” The end result was a mortgage with no equity
(Wall Street Journal 2008b). “The program...now accounts for more than a third of the agency’s
portfolio” (New York Times 2008).
15 “Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities” from www.treas.gov/tic/
sh/2007r.pdf.
16 Board of Governors Statistical Release H.4.1 Memorandum Item.174 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
University, has said that the tax law was responsible for ‘fueling the mother
of all housing bubbles’” (Bajaj and Leonhardt 2008).
The Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) also encouraged the increase
in home mortgage lending. By law, the purpose of the FHLBs is to subsi-
dize housing and community lending (12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(2)). For example,
as of December 31, 2007, the FHLB system had advanced $102 billion to
Citibank.17 FHLB advances grew from $100 billion to $200 billion from
1997–2000 and then accelerated. As of 2008:Q3, the system had advanced
$911 billion to banks and thrifts. In addition, the FHLBs subsidize housing
directly by borrowing at their government-guaranteed interest rate and pur-
chasing mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) for their own portfolio (typically
40percentoftheirassets). Asof2007:Q4,theyheld$132billionofresidential
mortgage-backed securities.
Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2008) point out how the FHLBs have become
the lender of last resort for banks and thrifts, but without supervisory and
regulatory authority constrained by FDICIA (the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act of 1991). For example, advances to Countrywide Bank went from $51
billion in 2007:Q3 to more than $121 billion in 2008:Q1.18 Between 2007:Q2
and2007:Q4,advancestotheHenderson,NevadabankofWashingtonMutual,
which failed in late September 2008, went from $21.4 billion to $63.9 billion.
Because the FHLBs possess priority over all other creditors, they can lend
to ﬁnancial institutions without charging risk premia based on the riskiness
of the institution’s asset portfolio. Siems (2008, abstract) ﬁnds the following
about banks reliant on FHLB borrowing:
[As] the liability side of the balance sheet has shifted away from core
deposits and toward more borrowed money, the asset side of the balance
sheet seems to have also shifted to fund riskier activities. Banks that
have borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Banks...are generally
deemed to be less safe and sound according to bank examiner ratings.
Just as had occurred in the early 1980s, funds provided by the FHLBs and
by brokered deposits guaranteed by the FDIC allowed small banks and thrifts
to grow rapidly and acquire risky asset portfolios concentrated in mortgages.
Forexample,theOfﬁceofThriftSupervisionclosedIndyMacBancorpinJuly
17 Data are from FDIC-Statistics of Depository Institutions Report, Memoranda, FHLB ad-
vances (www2.fdic.gov/sdi/rpt Financial.asp and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC): https://cdr.fﬁec.gov/public/SearchFacsimiles.aspx), (Schedule RC- Balance Sheet and RC-
M–Memoranda, 5.a).
18 Data are from the FFIEC (https://cdr.fﬁec.gov/public/SearchFacsimiles.aspx). In January
2008, Bank of America agreed to a merger with Countrywide, which was a casualty of sub-
prime lending. Shortly after the subprime crisis broke, the Wall Street Journal (2007a) reported
about Countrywide, the largest independent mortgage lender in the United States: “Countrywide is
counting on its savings bank, along with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to fund nearly all of its
future lending by drawing on deposits and borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Bank system.”R. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 175
2008 at a cost estimated by the FDIC at about $9 billion (Wall Street Journal
2008c). From December 2001 through June 2008, its assets grew from $7.4
billion to $30.7 billion. As of the latter date, IndyMac ﬁnanced 51 percent of
its assets with FHLB advances and brokered deposits.19
The homeownership rate was at 64 percent in 1986, where it remained
through1995. Startingin1996, itbegantorise. Homeownershipratespeaked
in2005at69percent. Inrealterms, housepricesremainedsteadyoverthepe-
riod1950–1997(measuredusingtheCase-Shillerindexfrom1950–74andthe
OFHEO index thereafter both deﬂated by the consumer price index). Starting
in1999,theybegantorisebeyondtheirpreviouscyclicalpeaks(reachedinthe
mid-1950s, late 1970s, and early 1990s) and then rose somewhat more than
50percentaboveboththeir1995valueandtheirlong-runhistoricalaverage.20
The ratio of house prices to household incomes remained at its longer-run his-
torical average of somewhat less than 1.9 until 2001. It then climbed sharply
and reached 2.4 in 2006 (Corkery and Hagerty 2008).
OneofthemajorpublicpolicyprioritiesoftheUnitedStatesistoincrease
home ownership. Just as the incentives to risk-taking produced by the ﬁnan-
cial safety net encouraged leverage in the ﬁnancial sector, affordable housing
programs worked to make housing affordable by encouraging homeowners to
leveragetheirhomepurchaseswithhighloan-to-valueratios.21 Theincentives
for excessive leveraging created both by the ﬁnancial safety net and by gov-
ernment programs to increase homeownership worked to create the fragility
of the ﬁnancial system revealed in the summer of 2007.
5. TBTFAND THEABSENCE OF MONITORING
In response to the distress in ﬁnancial markets that occurred after August
2007,popularcommentaryhasassertedtheneedformore“regulation”ofrisk-
taking. However,whywasexistingregulationdeﬁcient? Popularcommentary
highlights the private greed of bankers and the absence of control due to
deregulation. But are not bank creditors (debtholders and depositors) also
greedy? Do they not care about losing money? Why did they not monitor
bank risk-taking? As explained in Section 3 and the Appendix, the major
“deregulation” that has occurred has taken the form of an expanding ﬁnancial
safety net that has undercut the market regulation of risk-taking by banks.
Because of the ﬁnancial safety net provided by deposit insurance, by
TBTF, by the FHLBs, and by the Fed’s discount window, banks have access
19 FDIC call reports (www2.fdic.gov/Call TFR Rpts/).
20 FHLMC and FNMA data are from the OFHEO Web site. Data on home ownership rates
and real house prices are from the Federal Reserve System Web site.
21 Robert Shiller (2008) commented, “They [average homeowners] typically have all their
assets locked up in real estate and are highly leveraged. And this is what they are encouraged to
do.”176 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to funds whose cost does not increase with increases in the riskiness of their
asset portfolio. As detailed below, bank balance sheets became riskier, espe-
cially after 2003, through a signiﬁcantly increased concentration in holdings
ofmortgages. Nevertheless,thecostoffundstobanksdidnotriseinresponse.
As measured by credit default swap spreads (senior debt, ﬁve-year maturity),
the cost of issuing debt by the large banks did not increase untilAugust 2007
when the subprime crisis appeared. As a result, banks had an incentive to
increase returns by funding long-term risky assets with short-term debt. For
banks, this risk-maturity leveraging took the form of limited portfolio diver-
siﬁcation due to concentration in real estate loans and also the creation of
off-balance-sheet conduits holding MBSs funded by short-term commercial
paper.
The analysis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) explains how markets undis-
torted by government socialization of risk restrain risk-taking. Equity holders
in corporations have an incentive to take risks that are excessive from the per-
spective of bond holders because of the way that limited liability limits equity
holders’ downside losses without limiting their upside returns. As a result,
debtholders demand a return that increases with leverage, covenants that limit
risk-taking,andaccountingtransparency. Becausetheﬁnancialsafetynetren-
derssuperﬂuoustheneedofcreditorsofbankstomonitor,marketmechanisms
for limiting risk in banking are attenuated. There is no offset to the additional
expected return that banks earn from holding riskier portfolios arising from a
higher cost of funds.
Based on the fact that U.S. ﬁnancial institutions securitized subprime
loans and sold them worldwide, the perception exists of a ﬁnancial crisis
made on Wall Street. However, government ﬁnancial safety nets exacerbated
the excessive risk-taking by banks everywhere, not just in the United States.
The International Monetary Fund (2008, Table 1.6, 52) reported subprime-
relatedlossesforbanksalmostaslargeinEuropeasintheUnitedStates.22 As
of March 2008, it estimated that subprime losses for banks in Europe and the
United States would amount, respectively, to $123 billion (with $80 billion
already reported) and $144 billion (with $95 billion already reported). In
June 2008, the Financial Times (Tett 2008) reported, “Of the $387 billion in
credit losses that global banks have reported since the start of 2007, $200
billion was suffered by European groups and $166 billion by U.S. banks,
according to data from the Institute of International Finance.” For example,
22 Not all countries had formal systems of deposit insurance. For example, Switzerland did
not have an explicit TBTF policy, but the access of banks like UBS to the discount window of the
Swiss National Bank with no policy precluding lending to insolvent banks made UBS appear to be
part of a government ﬁnancial safety net. Bloomberg Markets (Baker-Said and Logutenkova 2008,
48–9) reported that the Swiss bank UBS reported losses totaling $38.2 billion between January 1,
2007, and May 9, 2008, and commented, “To buy the CDOs [collateralized debt obligations], the
bank borrowed tens of billions of dollars at low rates....From February 2006 to September ’07,
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government-owned German banks lost money. The New York Times ( Clark
2007) reported, “[I]n recent years, WestLB and others, like the Leipzig-based
SachsenLB,havegrownincreasinglyaggressiveintheirinvestmentstrategies,
hoping to offset weak growth in areas like retail lending with high-yielding
bets on asset-backed securities, including many with exposure to subprime
mortgages.”
After 2000, the exposure of banks to the real estate market increased
signiﬁcantly. Measuredasapercentageoftotalbankcredit,theamountofbank
assetsheldinrealestateloans(residentialandcommercial)remainedsteadyat
30 percent over the decade of the 1990s but then rose steadily after 2000 until
reaching just over 40 percent in 2007 (see Figure 2).23 In 2002:Q2, all real
estate loans of FDIC-insured institutions comprised 47.6 percent of loans and
leases outstanding.24 In 2008:Q2, the ﬁgure had risen to 55.0 percent. The
large banks of more than a billion dollars in assets accounted for the increase.
They held $800 billion in residential loans in 2002 and $1.8 trillion in 2007
(Krainer 2008; see Figure 3).
Bank exposure exceeded these numbers because of holdings of RMBSs
(retail mortgage-backed securities) and CDOs (collateralized debt obligations
formed with tranches of MBSs) in off-balance-sheet conduits called qualiﬁed
special purpose vehicles (QSPVs) or structured investment vehicles (SIVs).
Although a weakness in the structured-ﬁnance model was the lack of incen-
tive for credit analysis on the part of the mortgage originators who sold the
mortgages to be packaged into RMBSs, the bank-sponsored QSPVs created
the demand for the subprime and Alt-A loans packaged into these bundles.25
Banks set up these entities for two reasons. First, they created a proﬁtable
spread between the rates on illiquid RMBSs or CDOs and the rates on the
commercial paper used to leverage them. Second, they removed the mort-
gages from banks’books to reduce capital charges.26
Largecommercialbanksdrovethegrowthinstructuredﬁnanceafter2003
through the liquidity and credit enhancements that allowed the leveraging of
QSPVs with commercial paper. Liquidity enhancements took the form of
23 See Board of Governors statistical release H.8 (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8).
24 See FDIC Call Report, Statistics on Depository Institutions (www2.fdic.gov/sdi/
rpt Financial.asp).
25 The structured mortgage debt held in bank conduits allowed the extension of credit to
previously ineligible borrowers through funding of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and option
ARMs. In 2002–2003, ARMs constituted 16.5 percent of MBS issuance. From 2004–2006, that
ﬁgure rose to 43 percent (Mortgage Strategist 2007, Table 1.5). Until 2003, sophisticated investors
specializing in credit risk had priced subprime MBSs. However, starting in 2004, that due diligence
gave way to relying on the prioritization of payment through the tranche structure of securitized
debt with senior tranches receiving triple-A ratings (Adelson and Jacob 2008).
26 In principle, regulators could have required banks to hold additional capital. However,
when banks are holding capital above the tier 1 capital level mandated by the Basel Accord and
when loss rates are low, regulators are reluctant to force regulations on banks that would place
their banks at a competitive disadvantage with foreign banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.178 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly












Source: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Tables 1.54 and 1.26. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/.
guarantees that the bank would extend credit if the commercial paper failed
to roll over. Ratings agencies required these guarantees as a condition for
ratingthepapertriple-A.27 Banksincurredtheriskbynotusingthealternative
liquidity enhancement provided by issuing extendible paper. Credit enhance-
ments also took the form of bank-held subordinated debt, which is debt junior
to the commercial paper. When the commercial paper market became dys-
functional inAugust 2007, for reputational reasons, large banks continued to
27 “[N]early every [ABCP] program is required by the rating agencies to maintain a back-up
liquidity facility (usually provided by a large commercial bank) to ensure funds will be available
to repay CP investors at maturity....CDO programs...rely on bank liquidity support (usually in the
form of a put to the bank) to back-stop 100% of a program CP in the event that the CP can not
be rolled” (J.P. Morgan Securities 2007, 1–2). The Wall Street Journal (2007b) reported, “Globally,
the amount of asset-backed commercial paper is about $1.3 trillion. Of this asset-backed paper,
$1.1 trillion is backed by funding lines from banks, according to the Merrill report.” Note that
these “lines of credit” are not truly lines of credit. A line of credit is a contractual arrangement
between a bank and a ﬁrm in which covenants protect the bank from landing in case of ﬁnancial
deterioration of the ﬁrm (Goodfriend and Lacker 1999). In reality, the off-balance-sheet entities
simply had a put on the bank.R. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 179
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support their QSPVs regardless of formal commitments. That is, they either
purchased the commercial paper of these entities to avoid draws on their liq-
uidity facilities or they took the assets back into their own books. They did so
to protect their future ability to remain in the securitization business.28
Indicative of the difﬁculty in monitoring the riskiness of bank portfolios
is the lack of information on the amount of securitized mortgages held in the
conduits for which the banks retained residual risk. For the three U.S. banks
with the largest holdings, in 2003:Q3, the ﬁrst quarter for which data are
28 The losses incurred by banks in taking the mortgages held in conduits back onto their own
books constituted de facto recognition that these conduits amounted to off-balance-sheet ﬁnancing
rather than a genuine sale of assets in which the transferor neither maintains effective control
over the assets (a “brain dead” arrangement) nor retains any credit risk (a “bankruptcy remote”
arrangement). In recognition of this situation, on April 2, 2008, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board met to discuss changes to FAS 140, which governs the securitization of assets. The changes
they proposed would eliminate the QSPEs and force banks to take securitized assets back onto
their balance sheets.180 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
available, the amount of assets held in off-balance-sheet conduits ﬁnanced by
commercial paper and in which the banks retained explicit residual risk came
to $94 billion. In 2007:Q2, the amount came to $267 billion.29 On the one
hand, these numbers overstate mortgage holdings because they include other
assets. However, other data on residential mortgages ﬁnancing one-to-four
single family units held in private mortgage conduits, which do not specify a
total for commercial banks, show large increases over this period. The dollar
amount of mortgages held in this form were steady at around 1
2 trillion dollars
from the end of the 1990s through January 2003. By mid-2007, this amount
hadrisentoalmost21
4 trilliondollars.30 Ontheotherhand, theabovenumbers
for commercial banks understate the mortgages held in bank-created conduits
for which banks retained residual risk. Speciﬁcally, the totals do not include
conduits for which the banks possessed no contractual obligation to provide
back-up lines of credit or other credit guarantees, but for which reputational
concernscausedthebankstotaketheassetsbackontotheirownbalancesheets
afterAugust 2007. Finally, there are no available data for thrifts or for foreign
banks.
6. COMMITMENT TOA LIMITED FINANCIAL SAFETY NET
The current assumption of ﬁnancial regulation is that government does not
needanexplicitpolicywithcrediblecommitmentwithrespecttobankbailouts.
A term that has been used to describe current policy is “constructive ambi-
guity.” Although this characterization in principle admits of discretion not to
bail out all bank creditors, the prevailing practice of regulators of preventing
uninsured depositors and debtholders from incurring losses in the event of
a bank or thrift failure limits the monitoring of risk-taking by creditors. At
least since the failure of the savings and loans or thrifts (S&Ls) in the 1980s,
policymakers and the public have understood the resulting problem of moral
hazard.31 The subsidy to a ﬁnancial institution from the ﬁnancial safety net
29 The banks are Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America. Data are from “Bank
Holding Company’s Credit Exposure and Liquidity Commitments to Asset-backed Commercial Pa-
per Conduits, FR Y-9C Call Reports, Schedule HC-S” and can be found at the FFIEC Web site
(https://cdr.fﬁec.gov/public/SearchFacsimiles.aspx). An online search of Form 10-Qs submitted by
banks to the SEC revealed practically no information on the extent of liquidity commitments or
credit enhancements to SIVs (available on the SEC Web site).
30 See “1.54 Mortgage Debt Outstanding,” Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, July 2008 (www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement).
31 The bailout of the GSEs in summer 2008 created a widespread understanding of the prob-
lems of the “GSE model” with its privatization of rewards and socialization of risk. However,
with the intensiﬁcation of the 2008 recession that began in 2008:Q3 and that quickened after the
failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, governments explicitly extended that model
to all ﬁnancial institutions. Hetzel (2009) argues that this extension of the ﬁnancial safety net
arose out of the mistaken attribution of the intensiﬁcation of the 2008 recession to dysfunction
in ﬁnancial markets. Instead, the problem was a contractionary monetary shock produced in theR. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 181
increases with the riskiness of the institution’s asset portfolio, with leverage,
and with reductions in capital. The assumption has been that government reg-
ulation can limit the resulting incentive to risk-taking. However, the regular
recurrence of ﬁnancial crises that involve large banks with portfolios rendered
riskybythelackofdiversiﬁcationcontradictsthisassumption(seeAppendix).
In practice, government regulation of risk-taking has not substituted for the
market regulation that would occur if bank creditors had money at risk.32
The proposal below for severely restricting the ﬁnancial safety net and
eliminatingTBTFdependsupontheabilityofgovernmenttocommitcredibly
tosuchapolicy. Crediblecommitmenttolimitingthesafetynetrequirestaking
the bailout decision out of the hands of regulators. Credible commitment
avoids the worst of all outcomes—nonintervention when the market expects
intervention as occurred in the summer and fall of 1998 when markets were
surprised by the failure of the IMF to bail out Russia and when the Fed failed
to bail out Lehman Brothers as it had done with Bear Stearns (Hetzel 2008,
Ch. 16, and Hetzel 2009). Although the political system has bailed out
private corporations, such bailouts are the exception and they are extremely
controversial.33 A decision by the Secretary of the Treasury to bail out a large
bank would require asking Congress for funds. Congressmen would then
have to vote explicitly for income transfers that run counter to a long populist
tradition distrustful of the concentration of wealth on Wall Street.
Thefeasibilityoftheproposalrequiresacounterfactualofwhataﬁnancial
system would look like with a severely limited safety net. The large amount
of funds in government and prime money market mutual funds holding short-
term government securities and prime commercial paper is evidence of the
extensive demand by investors for debt instruments that are both liquid and
summer of 2008 by a failure of central banks to respond promptly and vigorously to declining
economic activity by lowering their interest rate targets.
32 The Wall Street Journal (2008a) wrote, “The recent ﬁnancial blowups came largely not
from hedge funds, whose lightly regulated status has preoccupied Washington for years, but from
banks watched over by national governments....‘I think it was surprising...that where we had
some of the biggest issues in capital markets were with the regulated ﬁnancial institutions,’ said
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.”
The amounts of money involved in the off-budget subsidies created by the ﬁnancial safety
net inevitably leave regulatory decisions open to challenge by the political system. Regulatory
limitation of risky investments that are at least initially ﬁnancially successful is likely limited to
extreme cases where regulators have a black and white defense.
33A decision to support a troubled bank is a ﬁscal policy rather than a monetary policy
decision, and it appropriately belongs to elected ofﬁcials (Goodfriend 1994; Hetzel 1997; Het-
zel 2008, Ch. 16 “Appendix: Seigniorage and Credit Allocation”). The Constitution requires that
“[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by
law.” This stricture gives content to popular sovereignty by the way in which spending subject to
the appropriations process receives public scrutiny. Sprague (1986, 5) wrote: “The four congres-
sionally approved bailouts were for Chrysler Corporation, Lockheed Corporation, New York City,
and Conrail....Each was preceded by extensive public debate....The contrast between the publicly
discussed congressional bailouts and the behind-the-scenes bank rescues by FDIC has generated a
debate that seems destined to continue so long as we have megabanks in the nation that might
fail.”182 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
safe. In the absence of the safety net, these investors would constitute a
huge market for ﬁnancial institutions marketing themselves as safe because
of high capital ratios and a diversiﬁed asset portfolio of high grade loans and
securities. Effectively, the market would create a parallel narrow banking
system. These institutions would constitute a large enough core of run-proof
institutions so that in the event of a ﬁnancial panic creditors would withdraw
funds from risky institutions and deposit them in the safe institutions.34 The
risky institutions would have to create contracts that did not allow withdrawal
on demand. Depositors at the safe banks would earn a low rate of return, but
they, not the taxpayer, would then be the ones paying for ﬁnancial stability.
What about institutions likeAIG? BecauseAIG is an insurance company
rather than a bank, it is unclear whether investors had considered it too big
to fail. However, its reputation did come from its regular insurance business,
whichishighlyregulatedbystategovernmentsintheUnitedStatesandforeign
governments abroad. Moreover, the relevant counterfactual for evaluating the
activities of its ﬁnancial products unit is whether the demand for its credit
default swap (CDS) insurance, especially by large banks, would have been so
signiﬁcant without the risk-taking incentives created by TBTF. The insurance
provided by CDSs allowed large banks in Europe to take risky assets off their
balance sheets to avoid capital charges (regulatory arbitrage). TheWall Street
Journal (2009) reported:
The beneﬁciaries of the government’s bailout of American Interna-
tional Group Inc. include at least two dozen U.S. and foreign ﬁnancial
institutions that have been paid roughly $50 billion....The insurer gen-
erated a sizable business helping European banks lower the amount of
regulatory capital required to cushion the losses on pools of assets such as
mortgages and corporate debt. It did this by writing swaps that effectively
insured those assets....The concern has been that if AIG defaulted banks
that made use of the insurer’s business to reduce their regulatory capital,
most of which were headquartered in Europe, would have been forced
to bring $300 billion of assets back onto their balance sheets....
The alternative to makingAIG part of the ﬁnancial safety net would have
been to allow it to ﬁle for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy protection could have
offered policyholders more assurance that the assets backing their policies
were protected. As explained in the Wall Street Journal (2008d):
AIG’s millions of insurance policyholders appear to be considerably
less at risk [than creditors of the parent company]. That’s because of
34 Because the safe banks would have an incentive to hold only assets for which they had
done due diligence rather than complicated, opaque ﬁnancial products, their accounting would likely
be more persuasive to creditors. “When investors don’t have full and honest information, they
tend to sell everything, both the good and bad assets,” said Janet Tavakoli, president of Tavakoli
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how the company is structured and regulated. Its insurance policies are
issued by separate subsidiaries of AIG, highly regulated units that have
assets available to pay claims. In the U.S., those assets cannot be shifted
out of the subsidiaries without regulatory approval, and insurance is also
regulated strictly abroad....Where the company is feeling ﬁnancial pain
is at the corporate level, even while its insurance operations are healthy.
If a bankruptcy ﬁling did ensue, the insurance subsidiaries could continue
to operate while in Chapter 11....
NewYork state insurance superintendent, Eric R. Dinallo, testiﬁed before
the House Financial Services Committee, “There would have been solvency”
in AIG’s insurance companies “with or without the Federal Reserve’s inter-
vention” (American Banker 2009). However, in the absence of a bankruptcy
ﬁling,NewYorkinsuranceregulatorsallowedAIGtotransfer$20billionfrom
its subsidiaries to the holding company (Walsh and de la Merced 2008).
The following provides a proposal for restricting the ﬁnancial safety net.
The government must commit not to bailing out the creditors of ﬁnancial
institutions, especially those of large banks. If a bank experiences a run, the
charteringregulatormustputitintoconservatorship.35 Underconservatorship,
regulators assume a majority of seats on the bank’s board of directors. The
directors then decide whether to sell, liquidate, break up, or rehabilitate the
bank. By law, this conservatorship must eliminate the value of equity and
impose an immediate haircut on all holders of debt and holders of uninsured
deposits. Thereafter, as long as the bank is in conservatorship, the existing
deposits and debt are fully insured.
After being placed into conservatorship and after the haircuts imposed on
holders of the bank’s debt, the bank could still be insolvent as indicated by a
lack of bidders for the bank without government ﬁnancial assistance. In this
event, the regulators would levy a special assessment on banks to recapitalize
thefailedinstitution. Thespeciﬁcmechanismwouldinvolveanelaborationof
the ideas of Calomiris (1989), who examined the criteria that led to successful
andunsuccessfulstatebankinsuranceprogramsinthe19thcentury. TheFDIC
would divide banks into groups of, say, ten, with the ten largest in one group,
the next ten largest in another group, and so on. The individual banks would
pay deposit premia into their own fund and would be subject to an assessment
to replenish the fund if a bank in their group required FDIC funds after being
run and placed into conservatorship.
Each group would have an advisory board that would make recommen-
dations to the FDIC for its group about regulating risk, setting the level of
insurance premia, and designing risk-based insurance premia. The FDIC,
35 If there is an immediate need for the equivalent of debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing after
a bank enters conservatorship, the Treasury would supply funds from the Exchange Stabilization
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subject to Basel minimums, would set individual group capital standards and
otherregulationstolimitrisk-taking. Theincentivewouldthenbeforbanksin
a group to lobby the FDIC to prevent excessive risk-taking by the other banks
in their group.36 As a check, the public would see the cost of subordinated
debt of each group relative to that of the others.
Under this arrangement, because of the relatively small number of banks
inthegroup,bankscouldfeasiblymonitoreachotherforexcessiverisk-taking
and they have an incentive to do so. At the same time, there are too many
bankstocollude. Intheeventofarunonasolventbank, theotherbanksinthe
group would possess the information needed to lend to the threatened bank to
limit the run just as they did in the pre-Fed clearinghouse era. A demonstrated
willingnessofbankstosupporteachotherwouldinspiredepositorconﬁdence.
Essential to eliminating the ability of government to bail out the creditors
of banks is elimination of the legal authority of the Fed to make discount
window loans.37 Goodfriend and Lacker (1999) explain the role of the Fed’s
discount window in the safety net and highlight reasons for the Fed’s inability
to restrict lending to insolvent banks.38 They predicted increased ﬁnancial
market instability and an extension of discount window lending to nonbank
ﬁnancial intermediaries. In the event of a ﬁnancial panic, the Fed would ﬂood
themarketwithliquiditybyundertakingmassivepurchasesofsecuritiesinthe
openmarket. Itwoulduseitspaymentofinterestonbankreservestomaintain
its funds rate target.
In addition to closing the discount window, the Fed would have to limit
bankdaylightoverdraftstoamaximumamountgivenbyprearrangedcollateral
36 In this way, FDIC deposit insurance would become consistent with the common under-
standing of insurance in which a fund accumulates assets and the directors of the fund impose
constraints on risk-taking to mitigate moral hazard.
37 Goodfriend and King (1988) and Schwartz (1992) advocate closing the discount window.
One can make the classic argument for the discretion to allow use of the discount window for other
than extremely short-lived liquidity needs. In principle, with its superior information that comes
from its supervisory authority, the Fed can do better with discretion because it can distinguish
between desirable intervention to offset nonfundamental runs and undesirable intervention to offset
fundamental runs. (The distinction comes from Diamond and Dybvig [1983].) However, in practice
identifying the difference between such runs is problematic. The assumption that the Fed will not
bail out a troubled institution is historically counterfactual.
Historically, bank insolvencies have come at difﬁcult times for monetary policy, especially
times of high interest rates. Two examples are the failures of Franklin National in 1974 and
Continental Illinois in 1984, both at times of high interest rates. The Fed may be reluctant to use
its limited political capital with Congress to close a large bank, instead preferring to conserve it
for situations in which raising the funds rate is politically painful.
38 In principle, the Fed could make bank use of its discount window contingent upon meeting
loan covenants that limit excessive risk-taking of the sort imposed by at-risk debtholders and by
banks on commercial businesses. In reality, government regulators lack this ﬂexibility. They must
design an objectively veriﬁable set of criteria to limit risk that works for all banks and in all situa-
tions that exist or could exist. The reason is that they must defend their regulations in the political
system and must guard against international regulatory competition in which domestic regulators
favor their own banks over foreign banks. In general, regulators are understandably reluctant to
allow a bank to fail and eliminate individuals’ livelihoods. Inevitably, they will emphasize the
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postedwithit. BecausetheFHLBsystemhasassumedthelender-of-last-resort
function, legislation should abolish it. To limit deposit insurance to include
only individuals who are neither wealthy nor ﬁnancially sophisticated, the
FDIC would limit payouts to a maximum amount per year for an individual
Social Security number.39 Such a payout limitation would also eliminate the
current insurance coverage of brokered CD deposits.40
Even with a credible commitment not to bail out banks and without a
discount window, the Fed would continue to play a critical role. A lesson
from history is that severe ﬁnancial panics require monetary stringency (see
Appendix). The Fed needs to follow a rule that allows the price system to
operate to smooth cyclical ﬂuctuations (Hetzel 2009). In the event of a panic,
the Fed would engage in massive amounts of open market purchases to assure
markets that liquidity will remain available. With its ability to pay interest on
reserves, theFedcannowbuyunlimitedamountsofassetswithoutdepressing
the funds rate (Goodfriend 2002 and Keister, Martin, and McAndrews 2008).
7. CONCLUDING COMMENT
The monetary and ﬁnancial arrangements of the United States have only par-
tially been successfully incorporated into the broad constitutional framework
of laws that govern property rights. Monetary instability has been a recur-
rent problem. Financial institutions are not subject to the market discipline
of free entry and exit. Monetary and regulatory policies raise difﬁcult issues
of public accountability. Because of the ability to make off-budget transfers,
monetary policy with seigniorage from money creation and regulatory policy
with subsidies from the ﬁnancial safety net render difﬁcult commitment to
explicit policies. The current crisis should prompt a broad public review of
the institutional arrangements that assure monetary and ﬁnancial stability and
that promote the continued operation of competitive markets.
39 With the Internet, it has become easy to check on the ﬁnancial health of a bank. See,
for example, the Web site of Institutional Risk Analytics. With the disappearance of the ﬁnancial
safety net, banks would compete for depositors by providing accurate information on their ﬁnancial
health to such Web sites.
40At present, depositors can receive up to $50 million in deposit insurance by using a broker
who divides deposits among many insured banks under a program called Certiﬁcate of Deposit
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APPENDIX: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BANK
FRAGILITY
The proposal here to limit the ﬁnancial safety net and to eliminate TBTF
raises the issue of systemic instability. In the absence of a ﬁnancial safety
net, could insolvency at one large ﬁnancial institution create fears of losses
at other institutions and thereby initiate a cascading series of runs? Does an
inherent fragility in ﬁnancial markets create the need for a ﬁnancial safety net
combined with government regulation to limit the resulting moral hazard due
to the incentive to risk-taking? Any serious answer to this question requires
an examination of historical evidence of the phenomenon of bank runs before
the establishment of deposit insurance in 1934 and the subsequent expansion
of the ﬁnancial safety net.
Several conclusions follow from the following historical survey. Bank
runs did not start capriciously but rather originated with insolvent banks. In
the clearinghouse era before the Fed, panics only occurred in the absence of
prompt support for solvent banks from the clearinghouse. Unit banking made
the U.S. banking system susceptible to shocks. Before deposit insurance,
market discipline was effective in closing banks promptly enough to avoid
signiﬁcant losses to depositors. Signiﬁcant systemic problems occurred, as in
the Depression, only against a backdrop of monetary contraction that stressed
the banking system. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 677) summarize the his-
torical instability in U.S. monetary arrangements:
[Prior to World War II] there have been six periods of severe economic
contraction....The most severe contraction was the one from 1929 to 1933.
The others were 1873–79, 1893–94—or better, perhaps, the whole period
1893 to 1897, ...1907–08, 1920–21, and 1937–38. Each of those severe
contractions was accompanied by an appreciable decline in the stock of
money, the most severe decline accompanying the 1929–33 contraction.
The frequently expressed belief that, historically, bank failures have often
started with runs unprovoked by insolvency but rather precipitated by investor
herdbehaviorhasencouragedtheviewthatfreeentryandexitisinappropriate
forbanksasopposedtononﬁnancialbusinesses. Thatis,bankruptcydecisions
for banks should be determined by regulators rather than through the market
discipline imposed by depositors. Concern that free entry encourages fraud
and excessive risk-taking goes back to the “free banking systems” common
from 1837 to 1865 in which banks could incorporate under state law without
a special legislative charter. Rolnick and Weber (1984) and Dwyer (1996),
however, showed that “wildcatting,” deﬁned as banks open less than a year,
did not account for a signiﬁcant proportion of bank failures. Moreover, the
failuresthatdidoccurresultednotfrom“panics”butratherfromwell-foundedR. L. Hetzel: Regulation of Risk-Taking 187
withdrawals from banks whose assets suffered declines in value because of
aggregate disturbances. An example of such a disturbance was the failure
in the 1840s of Indiana banks that held the bonds used to ﬁnance the canals
rendered uneconomic by the advent of the railroad.
Calomiris(1989)comparedthesuccessandfailureofstate-runsystemsof
deposit insurance before the CivilWar. Several systems operated successfully
to prevent the closing of insured banks through depositor runs. The reason
for their success was monitoring among banks to limit risky behavior and
assurancetodepositorsofpromptreimbursementincaseofbankfailure. Both
attributes depended upon a mutual guarantee system among insured banks
madecrediblebyanunlimitedabilitytoimposeuponmemberbankswhatever
assessments were required to cover the costs of reimbursing depositors of
failed banks.
The National Banking Era lasted from 1865, when the National BankAct
taxedstatebanknotesoutofexistence, until1913andtheestablishmentofthe
Federal Reserve. It included six ﬁnancial panics deﬁned as instances in which
the New York Clearinghouse Association issued loan certiﬁcates (Roberds
1995). Although it is difﬁcult to generalize from this period because of a lack
ofgooddata,theliteratureallowsthegeneralizationthatbankrunsstartedwith
a shock that produced insolvency among some banks. In summarizing the re-
search of Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Calomiris and Mason (2003, 1616)
wrote, “[P]re-Depressionpanicsweremomentsoftemporaryconfusionabout
which (of a very small number of banks) were insolvent.” The mechanism
for dealing with the forced multiple contractions of credit and deposits in a
fractional reserve system caused by reserve outﬂows—namely, the issuance
of clearinghouse certiﬁcates to serve as ﬁat money among banks—generally
worked (Timberlake 1984). Elements of the National Banking system such
as government control of the amount of bank-note issue and reserve require-
ments on central-reserve-city banks that immobilized reserves in the event of
a bank run increased the fragility of a fractional reserve system in a gold stan-
dard. Timberlake (1993, 213) concluded nevertheless that “the clearinghouse
institution successfully abated” these monetary rigidities. When, in 1907, the
member banks in clearinghouse associations failed to act promptly to sus-
pend convertibility in response to a bank run, runs spread (Roberds 1995, 26).
However, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 329) wrote, apart from possibly
the restriction in bank payments from 1839–1842, there were no “extensive
series of bank failures after restriction occurred.”
The panics of 1893 and 1907 are especially interesting because of their
relevance to Federal Reserve experience. In the early 1890s, the threat to the
gold standard produced by the free silver movement and the resulting export
of gold strained the banking system (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 113–34;
Timberlake 1993). “The fear that silver would produce an inﬂation sufﬁcient
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severedeﬂationinordertostayonthegoldstandard”(FriedmanandSchwartz
1963, 133). A conclusion from the 1893 panic relevant to the Depression is
that if monetary policy forces a contraction of the banking system, in the
absence of deposit insurance, the existence of a unit banking system will
produce failure of individual banks. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Bordo,
Rockoff, and Redish (1994) attribute the absence of bank panics before 1914
in Canada to nationwide bank branching and the resulting ability to diversify
geographically.
The 1907 bank panic is interesting because the precipitating event was
the decision by the National Bank of Commerce on October 21, 1907, to stop
clearing checks for the Knickerbocker Trust Company. At the time, trusts
were to banks as today investment banks are to commercial banks. By forgo-
ingtheabilitytoissuebanknotes, trustscouldoperatelikebanksbyaccepting
deposits and making loans, especially call loans to the New York Stock Ex-
change. AccordingtoTallmanandMoen(1990), thepanicbeganwithdeposit
withdrawals from Knickerbocker Trust, whose president had reportedly been
involved in a scheme to corner the market in the stock of a copper company.
Because the trusts were not part of the NewYork ClearinghouseAssociation,
bankers, led by J.P. Morgan, were initially reluctant to come to their aid.41 A
prior fall in the stock market had also made the trusts vulnerable because of
their lending in the call money market (Calomiris and Gorton 1991, 157).
OnlyonOctober26, 1907, didtheNewYorkClearinghousebegintoissue
loan certiﬁcates to offset reserve outﬂows. Sprague (1910) “believed that
issuing certiﬁcates as soon as the crisis struck the trusts would have calmed
the market by allowing banks to accommodate their depositors more quickly”
(cited in Tallman and Moen 1990, 10). At the same time, stringency existed
in the NewYork money market because of gold outﬂows to London (Tallman
and Moen 1990; Bordo and Wheelock 1998, 53). As a result, a liquidity
crisis propagated the initial deposit run into a general panic. Roberds (1995,
26) reviews all the panics during the National Banking Era and attributes the
severity of the 1873 and 1907 panics to the provision of liquidity by the New
York Clearinghouse only after “a panic was under way.”
Kaufman, Benston, and Goodfriend and King have surveyed the entire
experience of bank failures and runs in the United States and have concluded
that fragility is not inherent to banking but rather is a consequence of the
safety net created for banks.42 They point out that from the end of the Civil
41As Roberds (1995, 26) documented, the problem originated with the trusts, which lacked
access to lines of credit with banks: “The trusts operated under the impression that they could
‘free ride’ on the liquidity-providing services of the banks and the clearinghouses....Only after the
panic had revealed the illiquidity of the trusts was there any signiﬁcant change in the institutional
mechanisms for emergency liquidity provision.”
42 See Kaufman (1989, 1994), Benston et al. (1986, Ch. 2), Benston and Kaufman (1995),
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War to the end ofWorldWar I bank failures were relatively few in number and
imposed only small losses because the fear of losses by both shareholders and
depositors resulted in signiﬁcant market discipline, high capital ratios, and
prompt closure of troubled banks.43 Even in the 1920s, when bank failures
becamemorecommon, runswereuncommonand, whentheydidoccur, funds
were redeposited in other banks.
When the economy entered into recession in August 1929, Fed policy-
makersmaintainedthediscountrateatalevelintendedtopreventarecurrence
of the ﬁnancial speculation they believed had led to ﬁnancial collapse and
recession. That policy set off a spiral of monetary contraction, deﬂation, ex-
pected deﬂation, an increased real interest rate, and so on (Hetzel 2008, 17ff;
Hetzel 2009). Given the monetary contraction created by monetary policy,
bank lending and deposits had to contract. Similarly to 1893, given unit bank-
ing,bankshadtofail,andtheyfailedthroughruns. Asinthe1920s,“thefailure
rate was inversely related to bank size” (Mengle 1990, 7). In late 1932 and
early 1933, rumors that the incoming Roosevelt administration would devalue
the dollar engendered large outﬂows of gold (Friedman and Schwartz 1963,
332;Wigmore 1987). However, Kaufman (1994, 131) found little evidence in
written sources before late 1932 of “concern with nationwide contagion.”44
Calomiris and Mason (1997, 2003) investigated whether the waves of
Depression-era bank failures before deposit insurance reﬂected fundamental




Bank, which they believed to be solvent, and prevented its failure.45 In an
43 In contrast, the FDIC reported losses from failed banks to its Deposit Insurance Fund in
2008 and the ﬁrst two months of 2009 of almost 25 percent of assets (Adler 2009).
44 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contributed to popular misperceptions about panics and bank
fragility. Throughout the period of bank runs from 1930 through early 1933, the monetary base
rose. Using a money-multiplier framework, Friedman and Schwartz explained the monetary con-
traction through a fall in the deposit-currency ratio produced by widespread panicked withdrawals
by depositors from the banking system as opposed to withdrawals from individual banks perceived
as unsound. For example, with reference to the early 1933 banking crisis, they commented, “Once
the panic started, it fed on itself” (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 332). However, Schwartz (1992,
66) later stated that this “contagion” occurred only because the Fed permitted the money supply
to decline. The money-multiplier framework used by Friedman and Schwartz is inappropriate be-
cause the Fed targeted money market rates and, as a consequence, accommodated changes in the
deposit-currency ratio. The money stock fell in the Depression because the Fed maintained interest
rates at too high a level (Hetzel 2008).
Wicker (1996) and Temin (1989) contend that the ﬁrst two sets of bank failures in 1930
and 1931 did not result from a national panic but rather were conﬁned to speciﬁc regions and
the insolvent banks within those regions. Calomiris and Mason (2003; 1,616) also challenge the
blame that Friedman and Schwartz place on the Fed for the failure of clearinghouses to deal with
runs through suspension and certiﬁcate creation. Their explanation is that solvent (large) banks
were not threatened by the failure of insolvent (small) banks.
45 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation lent Central Republic Bank $90 million. Because
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investigationofallFedmemberbankfailures,apartfromJanuaryandFebruary
1933, Calomiris and Mason (2003; 1,638 and 1,615) found “no evidence
that bank failures were induced by a national banking panic....Fundamentals
explain bank risk rather well.”
Fischer and Golembe (1976) and Flood (1992) examined the politics of
the1933and1935BankingActs, whichcreateddepositinsurance. Roosevelt,
as well as many bankers and congressmen, opposed deposit insurance on the
groundsofmoralhazard. Theyfearedthatwell-managedbankswouldhaveto
subsidizemismanaged,risk-takingbanks. However,atthetime,thealternative
to deposit insurance offered to restore stability to the banking system was
nationwide branch banking, which would have favored large urban banks
to the detriment of small country banks. Not only did that alternative run
into the long-standing populist hostility to large money-center banks and the
oppositionofsmallcommunitybankstocompetitionfrombranching(Mengle
1990, 6), but it seemed to reward the bankers held responsible for creating
the Depression. That is, a common explanation of the Depression was that
through correspondent balances the large NewYork banks had drained funds




but also resulted in the separation of commercial banking and investment
banking in the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall). Because depositors
running banks were taking their money out of small banks and redepositing it
in large banks, deposit insurance favored small banks. In return for accepting
deposit insurance, large banks received both the prohibition of payment of
interest on demand deposits including the correspondent deposits small banks
heldwiththemandRegulationQ(RegQ),whichimposedprice-ﬁxingceilings
on the payment of interest on savings deposits (Haywood and Linke 1968;
Kaufman and Wallison 2001).
The Banking Act contained provisions designed to limit moral hazard in
the form of restrictions on bank entry and insurance coverage restricted only
to depositors with small balances. Flood (1992) argues that erosion of these
safeguards led to the banking problems of the 1980s. After the enactment of
bank was known as a Republican bank. House Speaker John Nance Garner, Roosevelt’s choice for
vice-presidential running mate and a Texas Democrat, declared in a congressional debate, “I plead
with you to let all the people have some drippings....How can you say that it is more important
in this nation that the New York Central Railroad should meet the interest on its bonds...than it
is to prevent the forced sale of 500,000 farms and homes?” Garner persuaded Congress to insert
language in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act that allowed the Fed to lend money to
nonbanks “in unusual and exigent circumstances” (see Reynolds 2008). As detailed in Schwartz
(1992) and Fettig (2002), this language has survived in Section 13(3), which permits the Fed
to lend to “individuals, partnerships, and corporations.” Ironically, this authority, which began as
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deposit insurance and, continuing through the early 1970s, strict unit banking
and restrictive entry ensured high net worth for individual banks by limiting
competition. High net worth militated against the moral hazard of the safety
net, that is, asset bets large enough to place taxpayers at risk. However,
technological advances in the 1970s, for example, automatic teller machines
and computerized recordkeeping that made possible money market mutual
funds,effectivelyendedtheabilityofregulatorstolimitentryintotheﬁnancial
intermediation industry. As a result, from the early 1960s through the early
1980s, capital-to-asset ratios (measured by market values) for the 15 largest
bankholdingcompaniesfellfromabout13percentto2percent(Keeley1990).
The recurrent crises in the ﬁnancial system since 1980 are consistent with
ﬁnancial system fragility produced by the incentives of the social safety net
to risk-taking, especially from the concentration of bank portfolios in risky
assets.
The remainder of this section reviews these crises. Although the most
recentshocktothebankingsystem,namely,thedeclinenationwideinhousing
prices,wasunprecedented,eachofthecrisesrecapitulatedbelowalsoresulted
from an unprecedented shock. The occurrence of aggregate shocks is not
unprecedented. Each shock interacted with a lack of portfolio diversiﬁcation
in bank asset portfolios to threaten the stability of banks with undiversiﬁed
portfolios. Financial fragility did not result from runs on solvent banks.
The term “moral hazard” became common with the S&L bailout incorpo-
rated into the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
in1989. Theeffortbygovernmenttosubsidizehousingoff-budgetbeganseri-
ouslyin1966withtheextensionofRegQtoS&Ls. Toguaranteecheapcredit
to S&Ls, which by law had to specialize in housing ﬁnance, regulators kept
RegQceilingsontheirdepositsatbelow-marketinterestrates. ToassureS&Ls
a steady supply of credit, regulators also maintained Reg Q ceilings on bank
deposits at a lower level than on S&Ls. Starting with the increase in interest
rates in 1969, these ceilings exacerbated cyclical instability in housing con-
struction by causing disintermediation of deposits at S&Ls (Hetzel 2008, Ch.
12; Mertens 2008). This policy of allocating cheap credit to S&Ls collapsed
in the late 1970s. When market interest rates rose above the Reg Q ceiling
rates on S&L deposits, holders of these deposits transferred their funds to the
growingmoneymarketmutualfundindustry. Byofferingdepositspayableon
demand and issuing long-term mortgages, S&Ls had borrowed short and lent
long. This maturity mismatch rendered them insolvent when short-term rates
rose above the ﬁxed rates on their mortgages. Regulatory forbearance then
led the S&Ls to engage in risky lending in an attempt to regain solvency.46
46 On S&L failures, see Kane (1989); Dotsey and Kuprianov (1990); Woodward (1990); and
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In 1970, the government created Freddie Mac and expanded the activi-
ties of Fannie Mae in order to maintain the ﬂow of funds to housing without
having to raise Reg Q ceilings. Following a pattern of raising deposit insur-
ance limits at times of interest rate peaks and S&L disintermediation, in 1980,
in the Depository Institutions and Deregulation Act, Congress expanded the
S&L subsidy by raising deposit insurance ceilings from $40,000 to $100,000
(Hetzel 1991, 9). Because CDs of $100,000 or more were not subject to
interest-rate ceilings, S&Ls, regardless of their ﬁnancial health, gained un-
limited access to the national money market basically at government risk-free
rates. Insolvent S&Ls then “gambled for resurrection” through risky lending.
Deposit insurance for their liabilities encouraged this risk-taking because the
governmentborethelosseswhiletheS&Lsreapedthegains. Thecostofbail-
ing out the S&Ls came to $130 billion (U.S. GeneralAccounting Ofﬁce 1996,
14). The proximate cause of the thrift industry insolvency, high peacetime
inﬂation, was unprecedented.
In the 1970s, large money-center banks exploited low, short-term real
interest rates to buy illiquid, long-term debt of South American countries.
When interest rates rose in the early 1980s, these countries threatened to
default on their debt. The debts of the LDCs owed to the nine largest money
center banks amounted to twice the size of these banks’capital (Volcker 1983,
84). The cause of the LDC debt crisis—the threat of widespread sovereign
debt defaults—was unprecedented.
In the late 1980s, banks in Texas concentrated their lending in oil and
gas partnerships and in real estate development. When oil prices declined,
all the big banks (Republic Bank, InterFirst Bank, First National City Bank,
and Texas Commerce Bank) failed with many being purchased by out-of-
state banks. More generally, in the late 1980s, pushed by competition for
the ﬁnancing of business loans coming from the commercial paper market,
largebanksengagedinsigniﬁcantamountsofundiversiﬁedrealestatelending
(Hetzel 1991). Because of TBTF, they could do so with low capital ratios
(Boyd and Gertler 1994). In 1988, when the real estate market soured, assets
at failed banks jumped to above $150 billion (Dash 2008) and, by 1992, 863
banks with total assets of $464 billion were on the FDIC’s list of problem
institutions(BoydandGertler1994,2). Theaggregateshock,namely,declines
in house prices in New England, Texas, and California, was unprecedented.47
TheFedkeptinsolventbanksalivethroughitsdiscountwindow.48 Inresponse,
Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Insurance Act
47 In both California and Massachusetts, real house prices peaked toward the end of the
1980s and then fell 30 percent over the next seven years. Real house prices are measured by the
OFHEO House Price Index deﬂated by the CPI, less shelter (Wolman and Stilwell 2008).
48 Of the 418 banks that borrowed from the discount window for an extended period, 90
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(FDICIA) with the intent of forcing regulators to close banks before they
became insolvent.
ThenextepisodeofﬁnancialinstabilityoccurredwiththeAsiaandRussia
crisis that began in the summer of 1997.49 In early 1995, the Treasury, with
the Exchange Stabilization Fund; the Fed, with swap accounts; and the IMF
had bailed out international investors holding Mexican Tesobonos (Mexican
governmentdebtdenominatedindollars)whowereﬂeeingaMexicorendered
unstable by political turmoil. That bailout created the assumption that the
United States would intervene to prevent ﬁnancial collapse in its strategic
allies. Russia was included as “too nuclear” to fail. Subsequently, large
banks increased dramatically their short-term lending to Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and South Korea. The Asia crisis emerged when the overvalued,
pegged exchange rates of these countries collapsed, revealing an insolvent
banking system. Because of the size of the insolvencies as a fraction of the
affected countries GDP, the prevailing TBTF assumption thatAsian countries
would bail out their banking systems suddenly disappeared. Western banks
had not done due diligence in their lending under the assumption that in a
ﬁnancialcrisisthecombinationofshort-termmaturitiesandIMFmoneywould
assure a quick, safe exit. They abruptly ceased lending (Hetzel 2008, Ch.
16). The fundamental aggregate shock—the emergence of China as an export
powerhousethatreducedthecompetitivenessoftheAsianTigersandrendered
their exchange rates overvalued—was unprecedented.
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